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SIZA, KOOLHAAS, AND THE OTHERS:
Notes on a Research into the Minutia 
of Architectural Experience
Abstract: Our research delves into the minutia of architectural experience, in a (neuro)phenomenal sense, from 
an architectural theory standpoint. Phenomenology of architecture and aesthetic theory offered sophisticated 
empirical definitions and descriptions of architectural experience for the better part of the 20th century. While the 
ineffable dimension of architectural experience is an inevitability, some of its previously inaccessible aspects 
are now coming to light, as new areas of inquiry tap into and unveil the complexity of our engagement with our 
surroundings—particularly through neurophenomenology and neuro-aesthetics. Thus, confirmations of previously 
theorized aspects and further revelations about experience and its components can now be extracted. It is our 
view that such confirmations and revelations are particularly interesting for architectural theory as an area of 
scientific inquiry. In our broader research, these are considered adjuvants in our looking for what we designate as 
evidence of experiential phenomena, and instrumental in further theorizing their underlying components in a way 
that is methodologically and hermeneutically coherent throughout. A retrospective reading of architectural theory 
and of architectural authorship and production is proposed in our research—a study of architectural experience 
in its artifacts. Through such artifacts, we seek to build an interpretive study of architects Álvaro Siza and Rem 
Koolhaas in their approach to architecture as a lengthy, complex, and meandering exercise, which culminates 
in a fully accomplished authorial work delivered to others, ultimately for their experience. Aspiring to a broader 
characterization of their authorial methods and resulting architectures, in their particular experiential qualities, we 
focus our attention on the specificities of two examples: Museu de Serralves (1991-1999) by Siza and Casa da 
Música (1999-2005) by Koolhaas/OMA. With this paper, we seek to contextualize some aspects of a larger research.
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INTRODUCTION
It may very well be that the definition of architecture 
is as elusive as the definition of (its) experience. 
The impossibility of an exact definition of one and 
the other has perhaps something to do with what 
Steen Eiler Rasmussen (1959) posited as “the correct 
idea of architecture as something indivisible”. In 
his Experiencing Architecture, the author continues, 
“Architecture is not produced simply by adding plans 
and sections to elevations. It is something else and 
something more. It is impossible to explain precisely 
what it is—its limits are by no means well-defined” (9).
In 1910, Adolf Loos (2007) had eloquently 
conveyed a similar idea that “a true building makes no 
impression as a picture, reduced to two dimensions.” 
Loos continued, in his particular jest, “It is my great 
pride that the interiors I have created are completely 
lacking in effect when photographed; that the people 
who live in them do not recognize their own apartments 
from photographs . . . [M]y kind of work cannot be 
represented graphically” (78, original emphasis). 
Rasmussen (1959) follows with the adage: art 
(and assuming the author here means, therefore: 
architecture) “should not be explained; it must be 
experienced” (9),1 something that can easily be said of 
Loos’s raumplan architecture: it’s hard to describe, one 
has to experience it. It is precisely through the in situ 
experience of architecture that its indivisible nature 
becomes apparent. Paradoxically, the very means 
through which this realization is possible also belongs to 
the realm of the indivisible. Experience, like architecture, 
is also greater than the sum of its parts.
“[E]mbodiment as lived experience”, as formulated 
by Chilean neuroscientist Francisco Varela (1996, 
346), is especially applicable to architecture. While 
inaccessible in its entirety merely through the 
observation of its parts, that architectural experience 
may be encompassed by the concept of embodiment is 
a notion that intrigued and informed our research from 
the outset, and that there is evidence of architectural 
experience as a process of embodiment to be found is 
an intriguing possibility we are exploring, as well. Thus, 
here, architectural experience is meant in the entirety of 
its embodied nature, in a (neuro)phenomenal sense. 
“L’espace indicible,” as formulated by Le Corbusier 
(2000, 25), may not be fully translated and indeed 
translatable into words, nor the entirety of its processes 
understood. Nevertheless, while the ineffable dimension 
of architectural experience is an inevitability, some of 
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its previously inaccessible aspects are now coming 
to light, as new areas of inquiry tap into and unveil the 
complexity of our engagement with our surroundings. 
Thus, confirmations of previously theorized aspects and 
further revelations about its components can now be 
extracted. Once these components become apparent, 
is it then possible to venture into identifying evidence of 
architectural experience, similarly to how components 
of architecture may be considered evidence of a much 
larger phenomenon?
1. CONTEXT OF AN ARCHITECTURAL THEORY 
RESEARCH ABOUT EXPERIENCE
Recent technological developments, particularly 
paradigm-shifting for the cognitive sciences and the 
neurosciences—notably, the advent of fMRI—allow 
for unprecedented inquiries and understanding of the 
mechanisms of experience, unveiling progressively its 
myriad of components.2 The lines between cognitive 
science and neuroscience are at times blurred of late. 
Here, (the) neuroscience(s) is used as a general term 
encompassing both. A distinction should firstly be 
established between what is here designated simply 
as neuroscience of architecture and neuroscience for 
architecture. That a distinction can be made is at times 
not clear or indeed acknowledged when dialogues 
between neuroscience and architecture are concerned, 
especially outside the focal point of their niche literature. 
If architecture is considered an object of inquiry and 
fertile ground for the survey of embodiment through 
the neurosciences, similarly to how works of art have 
proven to be particularly important as such, this would 
be referred to as neuroscience of architecture—a 
line of inquiry we are interested in. Neuroscience 
for architecture, on the other hand, would offer the 
possibility of establishing operative knowledge with 
a neuroscientific basis for the achievement of a 
given experiential result in architecture—a parallel, yet 
separate, line of inquiry, and one not explored within the 
scope of our research.3
In our research, we delve into minutiae of 
architectural experience, in a (neuro)phenomenal 
sense, from an architectural theory standpoint. 
Phenomenology of architecture and aesthetic 
theory are of paramount importance, as they offered 
sophisticated empirical definitions and descriptions 
of architectural experience in its complexities for 
the better part of the 20th century—classic works 
as Survival Through Design by Richard Neutra 
(1954), Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of 
Architecture by Christian Norberg-Schulz (1979) and 
the aforementioned Experiencing Architecture by 
Rasmussen (1954) regain particular relevance here. 
Although phenomenology of architecture, may have 
been considered as somewhat dated, a newfound 
interest has emerged as developments in neuroscience 
now open the possibility of (re)validation, through an 
intricate combination of philosophical theories and 
neuroscientific studies, and particularly through the 
recently founded neurophenomenology (1996) and 
neuroaesthetics (2002)—as neuroscience tries to find 
solutions for its hard problem,4 and points exactly in 
the opposite direction of Cartesian Dualism, in which 
mental phenomena had been theorized as non-
physical. Hence, a number of architecture theorists 
have directed their attention to what potential may 
emerge from architecture’s encounter with these 
relatively recent areas of inquiry. Mind in Architecture 
(Robinson and Pallasmaa 2015) and Architecture and 
Empathy (Pallasmaa et al. 2015) are recent publications 
composed of essays penned by both architects and 
neuroscientists, proposing exciting discussions on how 
this potential is already coming, and may further come, 
to fruition. 
Architecture and Embodiment by Harry Francis 
Mallgrave (2013), is a particularly relevant achievement 
in exploring such potential. An intricate fabric is woven 
with phenomenology of architecture, aesthetic theory, 
and neuroscientific findings, to demonstrate the 
possibility of expanded explanations of experiential 
phenomena particular to architecture. Furthermore, 
Mallgrave (2013), architect, historian, and theorist, 
offers balanced chapters, summoning neuroscientific 
discoveries in the interpretation of phenomena 
particular to architectural experience, while arguing the 
significance of the moment at hand, stating:
The design fields . . . have had more than their share of 
tangents over the past half century, and designers are 
rightfully grown weary or distrustful of theory and its 
extracurricular “-isms.” But something new is distinctly 
coming into view. We are beginning to understand not only 
the biological complexity of our embodied natures but also 
our profound implication with the physical environment at 
large. All of this should give us pause for reflection. (16)
Mallgrave (2013, 11) states many of aesthetic theory’s 
hypotheses “were remarkably close to what we are 
learning today” even if “speculative in nature and 
based on limited psychological knowledge,” indeed, 
a conclusion the founder of neurophenomenology, 
Francisco Varela (1996), had previously proposed, and 
Semir Zeki, founder of neuroaesthetics, recognized as 
a corollary of his studies (Semir Zeki, Neuroscientist 
2017). It is precisely in the vis-à-vis between 
phenomenology of architecture and aesthetic theory 
with the neurosciences that such conclusions can 
be reached. This opens the possibility of recognizing 
when phenomenology of architecture and architectural 
theory tout court have correctly characterized aspects 
of experience, while additionally making it possible 
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to identify how architects have similarly intuited this 
and made it come to fruition through their designs 
as built works. Zeki’s very recent considerations have 
heightened resonance: “You may be shocked with what 
I’m about to say: I think artists are neuroscientists, but 
they know the brain in a different way” (Zeki 2019).
Part of the scope of our research is to highlight 
that very intuition, demonstrating its embedding in 
architectural production through evidence we believe is 
to be found and which we intend to bring forward. From 
an architectural theory and historiography standpoint, 
the possibility of a retrospective reading of both 
architectural theory and architectural production, as a 
result of the moment at hand, is most enthralling. 
Indeed, as demonstrated with Architecture and 
Embodiment (Mallgrave 2013), confirmations and new 
revelations about the particularities of architectural 
experience can be extracted through a combination 
of existing and new areas of scientific inquiry, with the 
role of phenomenology of architecture and aesthetic 
theory highly reinforced here, as they established 
the groundwork through which dialogues between 
architecture and the neurosciences are now possible. 
It is our view that these confirmations and revelations 
are particularly interesting for architectural theory as 
an area of scientific inquiry. In our research, they are 
considered adjuvants in our search for evidence of 
experiential phenomena particular to architecture and 
instrumental in theorizing their underlying processes 
and components in a way that is methodologically and 
hermeneutically coherent throughout. Conversely, we 
argue that further hypotheses about experience may 
be theorized, from an architectural theory standpoint, 
to then be tested by the neurosciences—this is an 
exercise architects are in a uniquely privileged position 
to contribute to.
2. HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Our research is a study, in the field of theory of 
architecture, about architectural experience in what we 
consider to be its artifacts—recognizing phenomena 
of embodiment within the materials particular to 
architecture. Therefore, artifact here designates 
evidence of experiential phenomena, and thus, in a way, 
evidence of phenomena of embodiment. 
While we draw from the works of Steen Eiler 
Rasmussen, Christian Norberg-Schulz, and others—
authors who produced some of the most successful 
observations on the subject of architectural experience, 
by theorizing and illustrating experiential effects 
vis-à-vis architectural settings, usually by means of 
specific isolated examples—we believe there is much 
to be found about architectural experience and its 
complexities within a single architectural production, 
from authorial intention to in situ fruition. It should also 
be noted that, our research is not aimed at proposing 
the replacement of metaphors of expression about 
experience with new terminologies, but rather to draw 
from a (neuro)phenomenological understanding of a 
given component of experience, in order to recognize it 
within those metaphors. Moreover, a metaphor in itself 
may compose an artifact.
In our research, a necessary distinction is 
established between the others (non-authors, who 
experience a given architectural setting) and the authors 
(who propose a given architectural setting, who will 
experience said architectural setting from an intrinsically 
different position than that of non-authors)—as there are 
artifacts that clearly belong to the authors while others 
belong to the others. The idea that experience pertains 
to these two realms, that of the authors and that of the 
others, is, indeed, traceable to Álvaro Siza’s and Rem 
Koolhaas’s words, and while similar at first glance, 
nuanced hues about particularities of the architectural 
métier are detectable. Koolhaas (2012) proposes that 
“A building has at least two lives—the one imagined by 
its maker and the life it lives afterward—and they are 
never the same.” While Siza (1992) posits, “Architectural 
creation is born of an emotion, an emotion urged by a 
moment and a place. The project, and the construction, 
demand the authors release themselves from that 
emotion, in a progressive distancing—conveying it whole 
and occult. From then on, the emotion belongs to the 
other(s)” (9). 
Once evidence of the authorial intention is 
unveiled, is it observable as experiential phenomena 
in situ? Conversely, are the experiential phenomena 
(observed and expressed) traceable to the intention? As 
a comparative exercise emerges, what further details 
arise about architecture and (its) experience?
We seek to establish an interpretive study of Álvaro 
Siza’s and Rem Koolhaas’s approach to architecture 
as a lengthy, complex, and meandering exercise, which 
culminates in a fully accomplished authorial work 
delivered to others, ultimately, for their experience. 
3. METHODOLOGY AND OTHER NOTES ABOUT AN 
ONGOING RESEARCH
Our research is designed to demonstrate the embodied 
nature of architectural experience in its artifacts. Thus, 
it is through evidence of experiential phenomena that 
the construction of our greater object of analysis is 
built by composing a long section through instances 
of architectural experience, it is then possible to 
venture into their expanded characterization and, quite 
importantly, to bring forward correlations between them.
Aspiring to a broader characterization of the 
authors’ methods and resulting architectures, we are 
292
Siza, Koolhas, and the Others
focusing our attention on two examples, both in the city 
of Porto. Museu de Serralves (1991-1999) by Álvaro Siza, 
a museum of contemporary art within the grounds of 
an art deco house with a large gated park, and Casa da 
Música (1999-2005) by Rem Koolhaas/OMA, a concert 
hall in a consolidated area of the city, in what was once 
(and is now again) considered the second city center of 
Porto. These two cultural institutions played their role in 
what has been described as Porto’s recent renaissance, 
helping revitalize a once rich and then dwindling local 
cultural scene (as it was in the latter part of the 20th 
century), with visible gravitational pull on a wider public, 
both local and international.
The demonstration of our hypothesis is built 
through the collection and analysis of a combination 
of materials, specifically directed at unearthing 
artifacts of embodiment as our navigational compass: 
by a retrospective reading of authorial materials, i.e. 
published materials and archival materials (some of 
which never before published), by collating a selection 
of existing materials, and by the structured collection 
of new in situ materials. The resulting greater object 
and ensuing analysis differ from previous studies in 
their raison d’être, in our particular considerations about 
these buildings, about these authors, and in a broader 
sense, about architectural experience. 
The authors’ archives are of paramount 
importance for our research. Architects make use of 
specific speculative models as methods of anticipation 
as they engage in rehearsals and simulations of a 
design later to become built architecture. We posit this 
prospective and speculative process results both from 
and in an intention. Regardless of whether this intention 
is consciously or not embedded in their designs, great 
architects propose, in effect, architectural settings 
for experience, honed and curated by a complex and 
painstaking articulation of architectural solutions with 
a programmatic problem. This is in line with what Le 
Corbusier (2000) suggested in 1945: that ineffable space 
is manifested as a result of the “efficiency of the [artist’s] 
intentions whether consciously controlled or not.”5 In 
his signature grandiose style, Le Corbusier continues, 
“[S]eized or elusive, these intentions nevertheless exist 
and are rooted in intuition, that miraculous catalyst 
of acquired wisdoms, assimilated, even forgotten. In 
a completed and successful work there are hidden 
masses of intentions . . .” (24-25).
Rather than sleek monograph illustrations and 
expensive display models, we selected not-meant-for-
publication materials to inform our inquiry. We argue 
and demonstrate with selected examples that these are, 
particularly here, both a vehicle for and a result of the 
complexities of embodiment, playing a most significant 
role in shaping the experiential intention embedded 
in these projects and successful as such, once their 
essence was translated into construction drawings and 
onto built architectural settings.
Similarly, we survey the others’ experience, though 
here the first-person account is taken into consideration 
in a non-systematic manner. “[T]he study of mental 
phenomena is always that of an experiencing person”, 
considered Varela (1996, 346). Indeed, Varela (1996, 344) 
championed the “first-person evidence” as fundamentally 
necessary for neuroscientific inquiry.6 Varela’s 
championing of the first-person account as necessary 
for the neuroscientific inquiry, was the transformative 
proposal that gave origin to neurophenomenology. 
Several methodologies have derived and evolved from 
Varela’s proposal. It is not yet clear or consensual 
whether these methodologies—such as the micro-
phenomenological interview (Petitmengin 2006; Bitbol, 
Petitmengin 2017)—will provide the ultimate access to 
“disciplined first-person accounts”, as Varela (1996, 344) 
intended. We consider both the spontaneous first-person 
account and semi-conducted interview—methodologies 
for the collection of narrations of experience not 
unknown to architectural theory, historiography, and 
critique. Moreover, artifacts of in situ fruition include but 
are not limited to narrations of experience. 
It should be noted that, in the particular case of 
architectural experience, as considered in our research, 
the direct observation of an architectural setting and 
corresponding in situ experiential phenomena is as 
important a means for the identification of artifacts 
as is the first-person account. The criteria established 
for methodological orientation behind the choice of 
examples was set to ensure direct and wide access to 
observation of in situ experiential phenomena, a wide 
variety of archival material pertaining to the authorial 
process, and an array of materials about the buildings in 
the media, and more recently in social media. Therefore, 
easily accessible and highly documented examples 
were preferred. Buildings where access to in situ 
occurrences of experience without interference would 
prove challenging (i.e. private houses) were avoided, as 
it would render our research too reliant on narrations of 
experience without the possibility of pairing our direct 
observation without interference. The selected examples 
are intrinsically different in their authorial processes, 
programs, and configurations, while simultaneously 
similar in their local and international impact, with 
overlapping sets of visitors and public—characteristics 
which we consider to be of added value here. 
Thus far, as the particularities of the evidence 
collected are emerging, pivotal moments of a more 
minute exactitude have been identified within the 
broader scale of the authorial process, and which have 
greatly shaped what has been observed in situ. These 
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minutiae will be brought forward as case in point on 
the correlations between the expected qualities of a 
given architectural setting embedded in the authorial 
intention and subsequent in situ experience. Additionally, 
instances have been found in which purely managerial 
decisions have thwarted the buildings’ full experiential 
potential—decipherable from the authorial evidence—by 
bypassing the architects’ intentions. 
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ENDNOTES
1  Not a farfetched assumption, as Rasmussen (1959, 10) clearly expresses his position a few paragraphs down: “Architecture is a 
very special functional art; it confines space so we can dwell in it, creates the framework around our lives” (see endnote 5).
2  Unlike MRI, the fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) detects blood flow fluctuations in the brain as a means to identify 
areas of increased neural activity as indicators of response to stimuli through directed task performance. 
3  Positive outcomes may emerge from neuroscience for architecture, namely in the search for the salutogenesis of space and ways 
for architecture to address health and well-being related predicaments through its spatial and experiential qualities. 
4  For more on the hard problem of consciousness see Francisco Varela (1996) and Kirchhoff, Michael D., and Daniel D. Hutto. 2016. 
“Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.” Edited by Tom Froese, 
Sebastjan Vörös, and Alexander Riegler. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2): 302–30.
5  We have inserted the term artist here as it is in line with the previous paragraphs by Le Corbusier. It is worth noting that Ras-
mussen and Le Corbusier intersperse the cited texts with architect and artist, and architecture and art, as seemingly interchangeable 
terms (see endnote 1).
6  “The claim about appropriate levels of description between brain events and behavior is, of course, not new and rather uncontro-
versial except for those who are extreme reductionists. The novelty of my proposal is that disciplined first-person accounts should be 
an integral element of the validation of a neurobiological proposal, and not merely coincidental or heuristic information” (Varela 1996, 
344, British English spelling in the original). 

